New Hermeneutical Principles for Hinduism

             New Hermeneutical Principles for Hinduism

(started on 3/8/2024)

Critics of Hinduism will point to verses in our Vedas, Dharmashastras, and puranas and claim that Hinduism is sexist, violent, or casteist. At the same time, we have staunch conservatives that use Hindu texts to advocate for genuine misogyny (not what pseudo-feminists call misogyny) and even child marriage! Hence, I am introducing a new set of principles for interpreting our sacred texts. 


My position is that we should be progressive, but not too progressive to the point that we dye our hair blue. I too believe that we should emphasize traditional values, but only differ on the zeal that we hold onto them. 


The first thing to note is that these ancient Dharmasashtra and Dharmasutra texts are jurisprudence texts, and are not to be taken dogmatically. They must be analysed based on the circumstances of the time they were composed in and not on whatever values of our time. Only the Shruti texts, liek Vedas, can claim infalliability and eternality. Smriti's are human interpratations of the law based on Shruti, but also existing tradition, and practices of cultured folk at the time.

Vidhi

The concept of Vidhi is not my creation, but something already in Hindu Tradition.

A lot of these apply to niyamavidhi, where injunctions have understandable perceptible reasons. Prasamkhyavidhis too can be like this. But there is apurvavidhi where it is an injunction that has no perceptible basis (a reason beyond our understanding) which must be accepted at face value. The latter are all statements of the Shruti (i.e. Vedic texts). 



In my opinion, just because it is a Vedic injunction, that doesn’t mean it is an apurvavidhi. For example if the Vedic texts says one should not touch a venomous snake, we know from perception why the Vedas should say that-- venomous snakes can kill you. Vedas mean truth and it shouldn;t be surprising if it so happens that a Vedic statement can be backed up by perceptible facts. But know that once you base a Vedic statement on perceptible facts, you have yourselves a niyamavidhi or a Prasamkhya vidhi, and there is a bit of flexibility in its interpretation. A rule of thumb I would like to use is that if you can’t reasonably justify a Vedic injunction with perceptible means, then it is apurvavidhi and must be followed blindly on the belief of an invisible karmic results, but if you can justify it, then it is niyamavidhi and can have flexible interpretations without too much emphasis on invisible karmic results. 

Arthavada

The concept of Arthavada is not my creation, but something already in Hindu Tradition.


These are statements that are exaggerations or words of meaning. All bark no bite. Saying “yes” or “no” with 100 steps and flowery language. Any scriptural statement that seems to be a bit too much is likely an Arthavada. 


When a text says that you will be reborn as a bug if you commit a particular sin, it doesn;t actually mean you will be reborn as a bug (you may be reborn as a cat!), but all that is meant is that doing that sin is bad. 


These scriptures are poetical texts, and thus like any poetry it will use hyperboles or imagery or metaphors to make a point. It is our job to see through this and understand the purport.


Arthavadas in Vedic hermeneutics are not to be taken too seriously.    


Promotion of Order


It is easier to tell a child that they shouldn’t get up out of bed in the middle of the night because a monster will chase them as opposed to telling them that the darkness can cause them to bump into objects and get hurt. 


When Shruti or Smriti say a person will sink down to hell or accrue the sin of killing a Brahmin (though the crime is not visibly that heinous) or rise up to heaven, or get all their sins cleansed, these are to motivate a person to do an act or not do an act wither by fear or by enticement. Ordinary people, and even high class people, won’t completely listen to reason, and therefore the texts have these words to promote order, as in to make such people pay heed to the words. 

Episodic Contextualization 


Certain teachings in a given passage of a Hindu text, be it Shruti or Smriti, can’t be over extrapolated or overgeneralized. This shouldn’t be said, but critics of Hinduism will take a verse from the Gita or a small episode from the Bhagavatam and make a blatant generalization. A wise person would understand the context of the teaching as well as the setting of the story that the characters who speak the teaching are in. 


For example take Bhagavatam 6.18.42:


To satisfy their own interests, women deal with men as if the men were most dear to them, but no one is actually dear to them. Women are supposed to be very saintly, but for their own interests they can kill even their husbands, sons or brothers, or cause them to be killed by others.


You can hear the Pseudo-Femenists prattling about how this is misogynistic and that according to Hinduism, women are evil and selfish. However, if you look at the full picture, or contextualize it based on the setting of the episode, you would know better. 


The verse above was uttered by Sage Kashyapa when Diti had tricked him into being obliged to give a boon for a son to kill Indra. Diti acted kind and sweet hearted to her husband and rendered service to please him so that when Kashyapa Muni asked her for a wish, Diti used that opportunity to ask for a son that would kill Indra. In other words, Diti took advantage of her husband’s love for the worse. Because of this, Kashyapa went on a lamentation about women.


Knowing this, we should wisely conclude that the statement about women being very selfish applies to women like Diti, or those who are willing to take advantage of others, not to women who are predisposed to virtue and selflessness. This is implied based on the context.


Reality Based Contextualisation 


Certain injunctions by Shruti or Smriti are based on the reality of a certain time and place. They may not be explicit, but we must take into account what historical conditions the texts were expounded or composed in as well as what assumptions of reality the text makes. 


For example, it was a common saying in the past that one shouldn’t drink water after eating fruit. This sounds absurd to us, but the thing was that in the past, people got their water from wells, which were infected with harmful bacteria. This bacteria would grow in the stomach when they came in contact with the sugars of the fruit the person ate, and that would make the person sick. 


Given the advances in water quality and sanitation, it would be foolish to boldly assert that we still shouldn’t drink water after eating fruit.


Presumption of Normality

This is a subset of Reality Based Contextualisation. Basically Shruti and Smriti texts make certain injunctions that seem to be based on generalized assumptions of reality, but more specifically it is when they imply a phenomenon as 100% when in reality is 80%.


For example, when hiking you may see a sign that says people shouldn’t touch snakes. However, you end up seeing a man in leather boots and with a snake hook doing exactly what the sign told him not to do. Well it turns out that this man is a professional snake catcher and perhaps even a researcher. He is qualified to touch snakes, and he would be angry if you told him that the sign said not to touch snakes.


The instruction of the sign in question assumes that 100% of the people who read it are laymen who have no experience with dangerous animals, even though it is like 90% who are such. What must be implied is that the sign doesn’t apply to the 10% who are professionals who are qualified to touch snakes. 


For a scriptural example:


Look at Manu 8.77:


A single man, free from covetousness, may be a witness, but not many women, even though pure,—because the understanding of women is not steady,—nor other men who are tainted with defects.”’


This verse precludes women (note how it says “most women and not “all women”) from bearing witness as they are fickle. The text makes a generalization of reality by saying that women in general are fickle. This is a Presumption of Normality.



And Medhatithi in his commentary says


 “As for the declaration (in 70) that ‘in the event of no witnesses being available, women may be made witnesses,’—that refers to cases where they can be immediately questioned, and there is no possibility of their mind being tampered with by any person


Here, we see the social reality that made Manu say what he said- that women were prone to have their mind being tampered with, mind you this is in court cases where all parties are males. There may be some scientific truth to women fickleness, and surely it may have been a genuine concern fo women being manipulated, but surely this can’t be the case for all women, perhaps just 70% of women. What this implies is that a non-fickle woman who isn’t tampered with should deserve a chance to be made a witness. 


Medhatithi would agree at least somewhat: 


In the case where both plaintiff and defendant are males, the evidence of females is not admissible; when however the suit lies between a male and a female, or between two females,—there women do appear as witnesses. But there is no restriction as to women alone—and no men,—being witnesses for women. In fact it is only in suits relating entirely to males that woman are admissible as witnesses only in special cases, since the only reason that is given for excluding women is their fickleness, but there are some women who are as truthful as the best propounded of the Veda and as steady



Likewise it was said that women and shudras couldn’t worship the Shaligrama Shila, but this injunction was based on the assumption that normally women are unchaste and that shudras are of bad-conduct. But from a passage in the Skanda Purana, it was clarified that the prohibition didn’t apply to chaste women and nor did it apply to Sat-Shudras, both of which don’t fit their respective normal assumptions about them.


I must make it clear that people are not an entire statistic, nor are they a mean, median, or mode. People can be a data point in a statstic that contributes to a mean, median, or mode, but that one individual is not necessarily a reflection of the statistic.

Statement of Common Occurrence


On another note of Reality Based contextualisation are statements of common occurrence. Sometimes what seems like a sage’s rule or injunction is actually a reiteration of a common phenomenon or practice. 


For example, if I uttered the statement,  “all objects should fall down to the ground” is not a rule as in an injunction per say, but rather I am uttering a statement of a common occurrence, i.e. objects fall due to gravity. It would be foolish to say that I am injuncting that objects must fall down, as if I am prohibiting airplanes or hot air balloons. 


Any so-called Injunctions which are Statements of Common Practice have no force in them, though it is encouraged to follow them.


Hyperexpectations


Sometimes certain scriptural statements, of Shruti or Smriti, will make an over expectation. If I tell a group of children to behave themselves, I am over expecting that they will get themselves into trouble, because children are known to get into trouble despite the fact that not all children get into trouble and even if the children I am talking to may be angels. 


The expectation that even angel-like children will behave badly solely based on the fact that some kids can misbehave is what I call a hyperexpectation. Maybe it is wrong to have hyperexpectations, but the Hindu texts use them and we have to account for them. 


When it is said that Shudras can’t worship the holy Shalagrama Shila, it was done on the hyperexpectation that the Shudra is an ill-disposed man, and it had to be clarified that Sat-Shudras, or those Shudras who aren’t ill disposed (unlike what they are stereotyped to be) are allowed to worship the Shalagrama Shila. 


Hyperexpectation does tie in with the Presumption of Normality in that people normally expect something from a person.


Again, I must make it clear that people are not an entire statistic.


The idea of generalizations based on a general frequency is not new. Such statements are called guNavAda. The Jaimini Mimamsasutras 1.2.11 says regaridng them, "रूपात प्रायात्", meaning "from form and from freuqncy/majority". When the mind is called a theif , it is compared with a theif (from form) and when the tongue is called a liar it is because the tongue is often used to utter lies (from frequency/majority).

The Preclusion of Effect doesn’t Preclude the Cause

This is kind of like the proverb: “absence of evidence doesn;t mean evidence of absence”


If I am not allowed to drive a car because I don’t have a license, just because I am told that I am not allowed to drive a car doesn’t mean that I am not allowed to obtain a license.


The effect is my eligibility to drive a car. The cause is my possession of a driver’s license. 


On a similar note, a 10 year old is not allowed to get a high school diploma because he did not complete his study at high school. But the lack of a high school graduation ceremony for a 10 year old doesn’t preclude his attending high school. If the 10 year old turns out to be a prodigy, then he is entitled to immediately go to high school at age 10 and ultimately get a diploma. Of course, we still would say that 10 year olds shouldn’t get a high school diploma because on the Presumption of Normality, we would know that 10 year olds aren’t generally fit for a high school education and by extension a receiving a diploma. 


On that note, while the preclusion of an effect doesn’t necessarily preclude the cause, the evidence of an effect implies the existence of the cause. For example, if for some magical reason, our reality is such that we prescribe a high school graduation ceremony for a diploma to a 10 year old, then we have to conclude that the 10 year olds are entitled to high school education. 


(edit, 8/13/2024):

Restrictive not Prescriptive

Some of the injunctions may seem prescriptive but they are restrictive. For example, the explanation given for animal sacrifices is that for staunch meat eaters, instead of saying no meat at all, they are told that they can have meat on so and so days and only after offering it in a Yajna. This is not a licence to slaughter animals per se, but it does minimise animal sacrifice and put those people onto a more vegetarian diet.


Statement of Ideality


Scriptures may mention an ideal conduct, and that is all that is meant, it is ideal. There should be no chastisement if someone fails to fit into an ideal (provided they put a reasonable effort). 


For example, if I say “A good child must obey and serve his parents”, that is an ideal. 


However, if a child suffers the abuse of his parents but stays out of filial piety (love for the parents), then he is worthy to be praised as an angelic child. At the same time, should the child disobey against such wicked parents and flee from them, he is not to be chastised though he is not praised as an angel. 


This principle is in line with logic and good judgement but doesn’t necessarily break the spirit of Hindu tradition.


Grouping by Commonality

(This is added on 10/9/2024)

When certain groups are listed as being enjoined or prohibited from something, we must look at the underlying comonality or any shared reasons. This is to preclude arguments that say texts are restrctive or prescriptive for certain groups simpyl because of bigotry, and as well as to preclude people from thinking that being mentioned in a list means they are qualitatively the same.

When restaurants give discounts to children and senior citizens, they are not saying that a child is on the same level as a (adult) senior citizen, but rather are grouping them simply because they are seen as vaunerable or in need of special care. After all, only the latter has the legal right to vote and drink alcohol.

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